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ATTACHMENT OF LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICIES
By sanctioning attachment of an insurer's obligation to defend and
indemnify the insured, the New York Court of Appeals has adopted
a unique method of obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident defendants
on foreign causes of action. This reflects a decision that the convenience
of the plaintiff outweighs the conflicting interests of insurers and non-
resident defendants. Although this result may be defensible, the court's
approach is open to both practical and const ,.tution'a1 , ;,- , A,
effective solution can be achieved only through legislation.
I
SEIDER AND SIMPSON
State courts have quasi in rem jurisdiction over property located
within their state's borders. Under the Supreme Court rule of Harris
v. Balk,' a court may assert quasi in rem jurisdiction over intangible
property, such as a debt, whenever it has personal jurisdiction over the
debtor. The New York Court of Appeals, in the 1966 case of Seider v.
Roth,2 held that an insurance company's contingent obligations to
defend and indemnify a policy holder could serve as the basis of a quasi
in rem action.
The plaintiff, a New York resident injured by the defendant's
automobile in Vermont, wanted to litigate the claim in his home state;
however, personal jurisdiction over the defendant could not be ob-
tained in New York. The defendant's only contact with that state was an
insurance policy issued in Vermont by a company also doing business
in New York. Except for the suggestion that the obligations constituting
the res might include the duties to pay medical expenses, investigate,
defend, or indemnify, the court neither defined the res nor assigned it
a value.3
The decision was strongly criticized on both constitutional and
practical grounds.4 One commentator suggested that the court's dis-
1 198 U.S. 215, 222 (1905).
2 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
3 Id. at 113, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101.
4 See Seigel, Practice Commentary to N.Y. Crv. PRAC. LAW § 5201 (McKinney Supp.
1967); Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the Interstate
Corporation, 67 COLUm. L. REv. 550 (1967); Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction Based on
Insurer's Obligations, 19 STAN. L. Rav. 654 (1967). See also 8 B.C. CoIm. & IND. L. REV. 147
(1966); 51 MINN. L. Rav. 158 (1966).
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regard of the policy's "no action" clause5 violated due process, because
New York did not have sufficient contacts with the foreign contract to
permit a New York court to determine rights under it.6 Others pointed
out that the practical effect of Seider is to encourage plaintiffs to bring
their actions in New York courts in order to enjoy the liberal verdicts of
New York juries.7 Since most insurance companies do some business in
New York, and since the decision in Seider was not limited to resident
plaintiffs, 8 New York would be an available forum in virtually every
motor vehicle negligence action.
The Court of Appeals, despite such criticism, recently reaffirmed
Seider in Simpson v. Loehmann.9 The facts were substantially the same
as those in Seider. Chief Judge Fuld, writing for the court,10 attempted
to clarify and justify Seider. He stated that the duty of the insurance
company to defend and indemnify the insured was equal in value to
the face amount of the policy.11 His response to constitutional conten-
5 A typical "no action" clause reads as follows:
No action shall lie against the company . . . until the amount of the insured's
obligation to pay shall have been finally determined either by judgment against
the insured after actual trial or by written agreement of the insured, the claimant
and the company.
E. PATTERSON & W. YOUNG, CASES ON INSURANcE 705 (1961).
6 Comment, supra note 4, at 559-60. In Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 897 (1930),
the Supreme Court declared that Texas could "not 'validly affect contracts which are
neither made nor are to be performed in Texas." Id. at 410. In Watson v. Employers Liab.
Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72 (1954), the Court permitted Louisiana to subject a foreign
insurer to a direct action and thereby disregard the "no action" clause in a foreign con-
tract. The Court said that such revision was justified by Louisiana's legitimate interest
in providing remedies for persons injured within the state. But the cause of action in
Seider arose in Vermont; thus, a similar interest was not present.
7 See authorities cited note 4 supra.
8 One New York lower court has recently permitted a nonresident plaintiff to use the
Seider technique. A Norwegian plaintiff was injured in North Carolina by a North
Carolina driver. Defendant's insurer was doing business in New York and plaintiff at-
tached the policy there. A group of insurers sought an interlocutory injunction in federal
court to prevent attachment of the proceeds of their policies under an order of the New
York courts. The federal court declared that it had no jurisdiction to grant the injunction.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Vaage, 265 F. Supp. 556, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
The facts of the case present an appropriate situation for the use of forum non con-
veniens. In suits brought by nonresident plaintiffs, the New York courts have taken the
position that forum non conveniens is usually appropriate. See A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT
OF LA Ws, 122 n.5 (1962); Barrett, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 Calif. L.
Rev. 380, 404-05 (1947); Braucher, The Inconvenient Federal Forum, 60 HARv. L. Rlv. 908,
916-18 (1947).
9 21 N.Y.2d 805, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
10 Judge Van Voorhis joined in Chief Judge Fuld's opinion. Judge Keating wrote a
separate concurring opinion. Judge Breitel also wrote a separate concurring opinion in
which Judge Bergan joined. Judges Burke and Scileppi dissented.
11 21 N.Y.2d at 310, 234 N.E.2d at 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
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tions was that the carrier had full control of the litigation, and that the
insurer's presence in New York provided sufficient contacts for the exer-
cise of jurisdiction.12
Judge Keating, in a concurring opinion, agreed with the Chief
Judge and added that he thought Seider was fair because it represented
no more than-the judicial creation of a direct action against insurers.13
Judge Breitel, new to the Court of Appeals, and Judge Bergan con-
curred only because of the recent precedent of Seider.14 Although they
criticized both the theoretical soundness of attaching contingent obliga-
tions and Seider's practical consequences, they said, "Only a major re-
appraisal by the Court, rather than the accident of a change in its com-
position, would justify the overruling of that precedent."' 5
The dissent of Judges Burke and Scileppi characterized attachment
of the insurer's obligations as improper and illogical. They criticized
Seider for disregarding the policy's "no action" clause and for finding
jurisdiction where there were insufficient contacts.
Seider remains a danger to both insurers and nonresident defen-
dants since litigation of foreign causes of action in New York courts
involves both increased expense and high jury verdicts. 16 The procedure
developed in Seider, however, might be abrogated or effectively negated
in, several ways. It might be declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court or changed by the New York legislature. The New York Court of
Appeals, of its own accord, might reduce the effect of Seider, although
it is not likely to expressly overrule the decision. If the court is forced to
attribute a value to the res, and that value is determined to be minimal,
then insurers are likely to default and pay that amount to the plaintiff.
Thus, insurers could avoid, with minimal expense, the onerous conse-
quences of defending in New York. If another action is brought in a
forum having personal jurdisdiction over the defendant, the amount
paid on the default should be offset against the second judgment.'7
12 Id. at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637.
13 Id. at 313-14, 234 N.E.2d at 673-74, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 639-40.
14 Id. at 314, 234 N.E.2d at 674, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
15 Id., 234 N.E.2d at 674, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 640.
16 In criticizing the practical consequences of Seider-type procedure, Judge Breitel
said, "This State, and particularly its chief city, is the mecca for those seeking high ver-
dicts in personal injury cases .... Id. at 316, 234 N.E.2d at 675, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 633. He
cited Gilchrist v. Trans-Canada Air Lines, 27 App. Div. 2d 524, 275 N.Y.S.2d 394 (1st
Dep't 1966), as an example of a case brought in New York courts for the purpose of ob-
taining higher judgments. Although the accident in that case occurred in Canada, the
plaintiffs, Canadian residents, sued in New York. Moreover, defendants were ready to
admit defeat in the Canadian action, but plaintiffs continued with the New York pro-
ceeding. In light of these facts, the appellate division dismissed and urged that the action
be litigated in Canada.
17 Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 HARV. L. REv. 818, 834 (1952).
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FORCING VALUATION OF THE PES
Valuation of the res may be forced in two ways under New York
procedure. First, Civil Practice Laws and Rules section 6222 [herein -
after cited as CPLR] allows the defendant to replace the attached prop-
erty with a bond of equal value, thereby discharging the attachment. 18
Such a motion does not subject the defendant to personal jurisdiction
and requires computation of the value of the res in- determining the
amount of the bond. Second, the insurer and defendant may merely
default, thereby forcing the plaintiff to bring a-proceeding in aid of
garnishment under CPLR section 5227 to satisfy the claim. -
Although neither Seider nor Simpson presented the court with th6
valuation problem, Chief Judge Fuld said that the value of the debt
owed to the insured equalled the face amount of the policy. The Chief
Judge's theory received the approval of Judge Van Voorhis and prob-
ably that of Judge Keating who completely supported the decision and
would seemingly accept any rationale designed to effectuate the Seider
result. But four members of the court indicated that the res was Worth
much less than the face value.19
Analysis indicates that Chief Judge Fuld's face value theory,
grounded on the proposition "that the liability of the insurer [becomes]
fixed on the happening of the accident," 20 should be rejected. As Judge
Burke argued, the reasoning of the majority in both Seider and Simpson
is merely a bootstrap, since the duties attached as the basis for jurisilic-
tion do not arise until an action is brought.21
Even if the bootstrap is accepted, and an attachable res is assumed
to exist, the face value rule is not valid. The insurer's obligation to
defend is certainly not worth as much as the face value of the policy,22
18 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 6222 (McKinney 1963).
19 Judges Breitel and Bergan argued that even after a cause of action is brought,
"there is nothing of economic value to which the insured may make claim, receive, or
assign." 21 N.Y.2d at 315, 234 N.E.2d at 674, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 641. The dissent agreed. Id. at
320, 234 N.E.2d at 677-78, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 645.
20 See Stonborough v. Preferred Accident Ins. Co., 292 N.Y. 154, 155, 54 N.E2d 342,
843 (1944). Although Chief Judge Fuld never specifically cited Stonborough, iis case pro.
vides the sole judicial authority for the rule. Stonborough, however, may be explained by
its unique facts. Plaintiff was injured while riding in an automobile owned and driven
by her fiance. She waited to sue until after she had married the defendant; then the
insurer daiiied that the policy did not, cover interspousal litigation. The court held that
liability was fixed. at the time of the accident, avoiding interposition of the defense.- -
21 21 N.Y.2d at 820, 284 N.E.2d 678, 287.N.Y.S.2d at 645, see Comment, supra not& 4, at
555. ..
22 E.g., the duty to defend dearl cannbt be worth the face value of a $2O0,000 polici.
The duty should be assessed in terms of the actual cost of defending a suit.
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and only the duty to indemnify can be relied upon as the basis for such
a proposition. But a close reading of the policy indicates that the in-
surer's liability to indemnify does not accrue until an in personam
judgment is rendered against the insured. Carriers agree only "[t]o pay
on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay."23 Quasi in rem actions result in judgments against the
attached property; they do not impose a personal obligation of payment
and satisfaction upon the owner of the res, i.e., the insured. Thus, the
insurer never becomes legally obligated to pay if only an in rem action
is instituted.24
Assuming, however, that the duties to defend and indemnify com-
prise an attachable res, their respective values should be determined by
actual computation and not by the arbitrary face value rule. The duty
to defend might be assessed by requesting insurers to furnish informa-
tion concerning the cost of defending the average negligence action in
New York. The duty to indemnify might be valued in terms of its worth
to the insured as represented by the premium price. But the worth of
the premium is measured at the time of purchase, and it would be more
reasonable to consider the value in the light of impending litigation.
Although computing the fair value of the attached obligations is diffi-
cult, it is a more rational method of evaluating the res than the face
value rule. Judges Breitel and Bergan, having criticized the logic of
Seider, are likely to shift the court in favor of actual computation, since
there is no duty to indemnify in quasi in rem actions; and, since the
value of the duty to defend does not approach the face amount of the
policy, the court should accord only a minimal value to the policy. If
the court adopts this rationale, Seider's effect would be severely reduced.
An insurer's default would result in relatively minor judgments, and
thus avoid the expense and inconvenience of litigating in New York.
III
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF ATTACHING LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICIES
A. Analysis of the Mechanical Approach-Neither a Debt nor Personal
Jurisdiction Over the Debtor
The nature of the insurer's obligation also raises due process ques-
tions, since quasi in rem jurisdiction requires "property" within the
23 See E. PArreRSON & W. YOUNG, supra note 5, at 697 (emphasis added).
24 Lewis v. Continental Ins. Co., 239 F. Supp. 42, 44 (E.D.S.C. 1965); Sexton v.
Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 242 S.C. 182, 188-90, 130 S.E.2d 475, 478-79 (1963).
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forum. The Court of Appeals in both Seider and Simpson split on the
question of the existence of a debt (property) at the time of the attach-
ment. The insurer's obligations to defend and indemnify were con-
tingent upon the bringing of an action, and only circular reasoning
sustains the determination that these duties were fixed when the levy
was effected.2 5 Since there would be no property in the state, there was
no constitutional basis for the exercise of jurisdiction.
Regardless of whether a debt exists, there might be no personal
jurisdiction over the alleged debtor. Foreign insurers qualifying to do
business in New York consent only to suits on contracts made or causes
of action arising in New York.26 In the absence of consent, personal
jurisdiction is governed by the International Shoe test of "minimum
contacts . .. such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' ",27 If the cause
of action arises within the boundaries of the forum, McGee v. Interna-
tional Life Insurance Co. suggests that even the most minimal contacts
will justify jurisdiction.28 The answer is not as clear when the cause of
action arises in a foreign forum.2 9 Yet, in both Seider and Simpson, the
Court of Appeals implicitly postulated an answer: there was jurisdiction
over the insurers although the accidents did not take place in New
York.
New York courts have traditionally shown little hesitation in exer-
cising jurisdiction under such circumstances. In Tauza v. Susquehanna
Coal Co.,30 the defendant, a Pennsylvania corporation, had an office in
New York staffed by salesmen and clerical assistants, and solicited orders
25 See pp. 1109-10 supra.
26 N.Y. INs. LAw § 59(1) (McKinney 1966) provides that insurers doing business in
New York must appoint the Superintendent of Insurance as their agent "upon whom all
lawful process in any action or proceeding against such insurer on a contract delivered ot
issued for delivery or a cause of action arising in this state may be served."
27 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
28 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957).
In McGee, the defendant insurer's only contacts with California were the mailing of
the policy to the insured in that state and the receipt of the insured's premium mailed from
California. Plaintiff was the beneficiary of the policy and sued the Texas insurer in Cali-
fornia. Since the cause of action arose out of that contract, the Supreme Court announced
that jurisdiction was proper.
29 In International Shoe, the Supreme Court refused to determine whether personal
jurisdiction could constitutionally be asserted over foreign corporations on foreign causes
of action. The Court said that when the corporation's activities within the state were
few and isolated, personal jurisdiction "has been thought to lay too great and unreason-
able a burden on the corporation to comport with due process." 326 U.S. at 317. But it
went on to say that personal jurisdiction had been asserted when the corporation's activi-
ties in the state were substantial. Id. at 318.
30 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917).
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from New York customers. Although the cause of action arose else-
where, Judge Cardozo declared that the corporation was doing suffi-
cient business to be present in New York. Thus, he concluded, the
corporation was subject to the personal jurisdiction of New York
courts.31 But the fiction of corporate presence was later discarded by
International Shoe in favor of the minimum contacts test,3 2 and Tauza's
present weight may be questioned. In the case of Bryant v. Finnish
National Airline,33 the New York Court of-Appeals sustained jurisdic-
tion over a foreign corporation although the plaintiff was injured in a
Paris airport. The defendant's activity in New York---maintenance of
an office engaged in a small amount of advertising-was much less than
that of the Seider insurer. Bryant demonstrates the unfairness of sub-
jecting a party to personal jurisdiction on a foreign cause of action
unrelated to its minimal activity in the forum. Only the absence of an
appeal to the Supreme Court has saved the decision from reversal on
constitutional grounds.3 4
The Supreme Court considered the problem of exercising jurisdic-
tion over a foreign corporation on a foreign cause of action in Perkins
v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.?. Defendant, a Philippine corpora-
tion, was forced by World War II to conduct its entire, albeit limited,
operation in Ohio. Plaintiff, an Ohio resident, sued in the Ohio courts,
since the only other forum in which the defendant could be subjected
to personal jurisdiction was the Philippines. The Court concluded that
defendant's activities in Ohio were "sufficiently substantial '" to justify
that state's exercise of jurisdiction. 6
Perkins does not lead to the conclusion that foreign corporations
31 Id. at 268, 115 N,.E. at 918.
32 To say that the corporation is so fa "present" there as to satisfy due process
requirements, for purposes of taxation or the maintenance of suits against it in
the courts of the state, is to beg the question to be decided. For the terms
"present" or "presence" are used merely to symbolize those activities of the
corporation's agent within the state which courts will deem to be sufficient to
satisfy the demands of due process .... These demands may be met by such con-
tracts of the corporation with the state of the forum as make it reasonable ...
to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.
326 U.S. at 316-17.
33 15 N.Y.2d 426, 208 N.E.2d 439, 260 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1965).
34 One commentator on Bryant argued that the airline's actiyities in New York were
not sufciently substantial to justify the exercise of jurisdiction. Where the cause of action
has no substantial connection with the state, the local business must haye sought and
derived significant benefits from the state. Thus, the airline lacked sufficient contact§ with
New York, and the exercise of jurisdiction was unconstitutional. 51 CORNEL. L.Q. 586,
596-97 (1966),
35 342 US. 437 (1952).
36 Id. at 447-48.
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are subject to jiirihdictidn on every fokeign cause of action 87 The term
"substantial" indicates that the Supreihe C6iirt adopted a more rigid
test for foreign than domestic cduses df abtion, and a narrow reading of
thd opinion Would iiidicate that only a coiporatidri cOnduicting its entire
business ifi the forum Would meee the test0 8 Subjecting the Peikins
defeidant to jutisdiftiori in Ohib Was certainly not ihnfair since thd
president, all the corporate records, and the corp6rate funds were there.
But the insurers in Seider and Simpson were conducting only a part of
their business in New York, and their contacts were arguably not
"substantial."
Moreover, Seider-type actions cfeate a further dilemma for the
insurer, since the defehdant-itisdred will likely try to avoid New York's
personal jurisdictibn. 9 If the ihsured refuses to appear and cooperate,
the defense must be conducted without benefit of his testimony. Sui a
refusal, of cbtirse, might be constried a§ a breach 6f the policy's co-
operation clause,40 thereby rdlieving the ihurei of afly obligaton--and
eliminating the existence of the res.41 But not every refusal to appear
37 Most commeniators have indicated that Pei*ins may be limited to the unique facts
of the case; i.e., the Philippine corporation was conducting all of its business in Ohio and
the plaintiff could sue only in Ohio or ihe Phiippns. Seg Kuriand, the Siipiaine Cotirk,
The Due Process Ciuse and Thb In Pei-otS'am Jurisdiction of State Odurts, 25 U. Chi. L.
REV. 569; 602 (1958); Developments in The Law-State Court Jurisdiction 73 HAirv. L. RMv.
909, 982 (1960); Note, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations-An Analysis of Due Process,
104 U. PA. L. Rav. 381, 598 (1955). But see, Note, The Growth ol the Inlerhational Shoe
Doctrine, 16 U. UHs. L. Riv. 53, 530-81 (i949).
38 It should be noted that the Court uSed the term "substantial" in International
Shoe, 826 U.. at 518, in discntsinik th6 exercise of jurisdiction over foreign caises of action.
The use of this terminology in the only two cases cohsidering the probleii is not mere
coincidence. in McGee, where the cafise of action arose ih the state, minimum contacts
were required. But Perkins demanded iihore than that minimum.
30 N.Y. CEV. tPRAL. LAw § 320 ( aKinftey 1963) abdlishes the right of lirdltfd ip-
pearance in qtbasi in rein dctibr brought ih New Yoik. Subsection (c) provides:
an appearance is not ejliivalent to personal service of the siimmbns upoin the
defendant if an objection to jurisdiction . . . is asserted at the time of appear-
ance by itiont or in th& answer, unless the defendant proceeds with the de-
fense after asserting the objection to jurisdiction and the objiction is not ulti-
mately sustained.
Id. § 320(c). Thus, no defense may be made on the merits without subjecting oneself to
personal jurisdiction. Any giving of testimony would be construed as an appearance, since
the New York courts have said that defendant's participation "in the litigation as an
actor in a genuine and substantial sense" amounts to an appearance. Henderson v.
Henderson, 247 N.Y. 428, 433, 160 N.E. 775, 777 (1928). See Farmer v. National Life Assoc,,
138 N.Y. 265, 270, 33 N.E. 1075, 1076 (1893).
40 See Shalita v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 266 App. Div. 181, 185, 41 N.YS.2d 507,
511 (3d Dep't 1943); Cameron v. Bergeri 886 Pa. 229, 235, 7 A.2d 293, 296 (1939).
41 "When the condition [is] broken, the policy [is] at an end, if the insurer so
[elects]." Coleman v. New Amiterdam Gas. Co., 247 NXY. 271, 277, 160 N.E. 367, 569 (1928).
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is a breach of the cooperation clause,42 and the insurer might be forced
to defend without any help from the defendant. On the other hand, if
the insurer forces an appearance leading to personal jurisdiction over
the insured, a court might hold that the carrier has disregarded the
insured's interests and is therefore liable for the entire amount of the
judgment.48 Thus, the insurer's dilemma places him at a disadvantage
not encountered by the defendant in Perkins.
B. Application of the International Shoe Test to Quasi in Rem
Jurisdiction
Assuming that both a debt and valid personal jurisdiction over the
debtor exist, the mechanical rule of Harris v. Balk should not be fol-
lowed blindly. Jurisdiction should be governed instead by the fairness
test of International Shoe. Seider dramatizes the arbitrary nature of
quasi in rem jurisdiction, since attachment focuses on the fortuitous
presence of a debtor within the state. The existence of property should
be considered as just another contact and not as the sole determinant of
jurisdiction.44
Analysis of quasi in rem jurisdiction in terms of minimum contacts
and fairness is not without precedent. In Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co.,45 the Supreme Court said that classification of an
action for a trust accounting in terms of in rem or in personam was
unimportant, and stressed the interests of each state in the closing of
trusts.40 The California Supreme Court, in Atkinson v. Superior Court,
The insurer cannot, however, avoid liability by urging its insured to refuse appear-
ance. See Bachman v. Monte, 326 Pa. 289, 297, 192 A. 485, 488 (1937).
42 "[A] great variety of circumstances can be imagined under which the failure of the
insured to present himself might be sufficiently explained and excused." Shalita v. Amer-
ican Motorists Ins. Co., 266 App. Div. 131, 133, 41 N.Y.S.2d 507, 509-10 (3d Dep't 1943).
Most courts require insurers to show that the failure to appear created material prejudice
before their liability will be relieved. Cameron v. Berger, 336 Pa. 229, 233, 7 A.2d 293, 295
(1939).
43 The insurer "must act with requisite care . . . toward the Assured's interest. It
may, of course, properly consider its own interest, but it may never, never forget that of
its Assured." Smoot v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 299 F.2d 525, 532 (5th Cir. 1962).
See also Fidelity 8: Cas. Co. v. Robb, 267 F.2d 473, 476-77 (5th Cir. 1959).
44 The arbitrary nature of quasi in rem jurisdiction has been attacked by a number
of commentators. See, A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws § 29, at 102-03 (1962); Carrington,
The Modern Utility of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HARv. L. REv. 303, 309 (1962);
Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARv. L. REv. 909, 960 (1960);
Comment, supra note 4, at 567-69.
45 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
46 It is sufficient to observe that, whatever the technical definition of its chosen
procedure, the interest of each state in providing means to close trusts that exist
by the grace of its laws . . . is so insistent and rooted in custom as to establish
beyond doubt the rights of its courts to determine the interests of all claimants,
1116 [Vol. 53:1108
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rejected the mechanical approach and concluded "that the solution
must be sought in the general principles governing jurisdiction over
persons and property rather than in an attempt to assign a fictional situs
to intangibles." 47 Significantly, Chief Judge Fuld recognized in Simpson
that:
The historical limitations on both in personam and in rem
jurisdiction, with their rigid tests, are giving way to a more
realistic and reasonable evaluation of the respective rights of plain-
tiffs, defendants and the State in terms of fairness .... Such an
evaluation requires a practical appraisal of the situation of the
various parties rather than an emphasis upon somewhat magical
and medieval concepts of presence and power.48
He concluded that New York had sufficient contacts with the insurer
to satisfy the International Shoe test. His analysis, however, ignores the
interests of the defendant. Although the insurer is the real party in
interest, forcing the defendant to come to New York subjects him to
expense and inconvenience. Also, he is confronted with a dilemma
similar to that facing his insurer. If he appears, he faces personal juris-
diction in a state where high verdicts may absorb the entire insurance
coverage and expose him to liability for the excess. 49 On the other hand,
a refusal to appear and cooperate, if found unreasonable, could termi-
nate the policy,50 thus, forcing the defendant to bear the entire expense
of any subsequent action against him.
This conflict led a federal court to declare unconstitutional the
Seider-type jurisdiction in Podlosky v. Devinney.5 1 After the insurance
policy had been attached as the basis for quasi in rem jurisdiction in the
state court, the case was removed to a federal court. That court, apply-
ing the International Shoe test, held that New York lacked the requi-
site minimum contacts to subject the insurance policy to levy in
New York.52 Although the court limited its decision to attachment of
liability policies where no limited appearance is available, the decision
represents the first step in the judicial recognition of Seider's impropri-
ety. Seider causes expense, inconvenience, and unjustifiable dilemmas
resident or nonresident, provided its procedure accords full opportunity to appear
and be heard.
Id. at 313.
47 49 Cal. 2d 838, 345, 316 P.2d 960, 964 (1957), noted in 46 CALF. L. REv. 637 (1958).
See Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAS L. REV. 657, 662 (1959).
48 21 N.Y.2d at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 633.
49 For a discussion of the insured's plight, see Comment, supra note 4, at 565-67.
50 See cases cited note 40 supra.
51 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1968).
52 Id.
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f6 btih insurers and defehdants. It violates due process and, therefore,
should be overruled by the courts or corrected by appropriate legisla-
tion.
Iv
THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Regardless of the final treatment of the constitutional questions,
the New York legislature should act to reduce the hardship which
Seider creates for nonresident defendants. The defendant's dilemma
could be eased by providing for a limited appearance in Seider-type
actions.5 But a limited appearance would not remove the valuation of
the res problem, and the sterile and inflexible procedure would also
remain. Complete legislative elimination of Seider would be more
appropriate. Therefore, CPLR section 5201 should be amended to ex-
dude liability insurance policies from the category of property subject
to attachment.5 4
Legislative action, however, should not end with the abrogation
of Seider. Seider is a judicial attempt to provide resident plaintiffs with
a chance to sue at home.r5 The decision reflects a policy judgment that
53 See note 39 supra. The argument against a limited appearance is that a party
should not be able to contest his liability without subjecting himself to the court's per-
sonal jurisdiction. Although this rationale is normally subject to question, it creates a
more onerous situation in Seider circumstances. The defendant cannot simply default and
forfeit his property as in most quasi in rem cases since this would prejudice the insurer.
See Homburger & Laufer, Appearance and Jurisdictional Motions in New York, 14 Bur-
FALo L. REv. 374, 386-93 (1965).
51 N.Y. Cxv. PRAc. LAw § 5201 (McKinney 1963) presently provides:
(a) A money judgment may be enforced against any debt, which is past due or
which is yet to become due, certainly or upon demand of the judgment debtor,
whether it was incurred within or without the state, to or from a resident or
non-resident, unless it is exempt from application to the satisfaction of the
judgment.
(b) A money judgment may be enforced against any property which could be
assigned or transferred, whether it consists of a present or future right or in-
terest and whether or not it is vested, unless it is exempt from application to the
satisfaction of the judgment.
55 Plaintiff's residence alone is not considered a sufficient basis for the exercise of
jurisdiction. In Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), the Supreme Court indicated
that despite the convenience of the plaintiff in suing at home, the test was whether the
defendant had sufficient contacts with the forum. The court rejected the contention that
the nonresident trustee could be subject to Florida jurisdiction because the majority of
the litigants resided therein:
It is urged that because the settlor and most of the appointees and benefi-
ciaries were domiciled in Florida the courts of that State should be able to
exercise personal jurisdiction over the nonresident trustees. This is a non sequi-
tur. . . . [Florida] does not acquire that jurisdiction by being the "center of
gravity" of the controversy, or the most convenient locatioi for litigation. The
issue is personal jurisdiction, not choice of law. It is resolved in this case by con-
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the interests of resident plaintiffs in suing at home outweigh those of
insurers forced to defend in a forum unrelated to the cause of action.
Where the defendants are corporate insurers, severe prejudice is
normally not created by allowing resident plaintiffs to sue in their home
forums. So long as nonresident defendants can appear and cooperate
without fear of becoming subject to personal jurisdiction, insurers can
defend effectively in any state where they are doing business. They
maintain organizations experienced in the law of each state, and have
adequate resources to bear the costs of litigation.56
Wherever the cause of action is brought, one party will have to
undergo the expense of transporting some of his witnesses. The in-
surer's witnesses are normally at the scene of the accident, but the
plaintiff's medical witresses are usually located in his home state. By
forcing insurers to defend in the plaintiff's home state, the legislature
would be shifting some of the litigation costs from the individual
plaintiff to a group of policyholders.47
There are cases, however, in which forcing insurers to defend in a
forum other than where the accident occurred would create severe
prejudice. For example, if the accident took place in Arizona, and
numerous witnesses are needed to establish an adequate defense, the
sidering the acts of the trustee. As we have indicated, they are insufficient to
sustain the jurisdiction.
Id. at 254 (footnote omitted). Yet there are those who argue that plaintiff's residence
should be sufficient so long as defendant is not greatly inconvenienced. Justice Black, dis-
senting in Hanson, argued that where a state has substantial connections with the litiga-
tion, it has jurisdiction "unless litigation there would impose ...a heavy and dispropor-
tionate burden on a nonresident defendant .. " Id. at 259.
Professor Ehrenzweig has also incicated that plaintiff's residence might be a constitu-
tional basis for jurisdiction, "since, after all, the plaintiff's harm is' ultimately most
dearly situated at the place of his abode." He continued:
That the United States Supreme Court has not yft tledared jurisdictions
based on the plaintiff's domicile to be constitutional is dearly due to the lack of
statutory schemes based on such jurisdiction. It is regrettable that legislatorshave so far persisted in using traditional formulas and have thus precluded the
Court from giving new life to our obsolescent law of jurisdiction.'
Ehrenzweig, Ehrenzweig in Reply, 9 J. PuBuc LAW 328, 331 (1960).
Although these arguments are persuasive for considering plaintiffs residence' in
exercising jurisdiction, Hanson showed that a majority of the Court is not willing to
disregard the defendant's contacts.
56 For another view that forcing insurers to defend in New York would not be .un-
fair, see 51 MINN. L. R1v. 158, 163 (1966).
57 This is somewhat analogous to the concept of non-fault liability-shifting the cost
from the injured party to the insurer, who can theoretically spread the loss among a
larger group of people. Certainly insurers by their very nature can spread the litigation
expenses, thereby reducing the plaintiff's financial burden. See generally A. EHRENZWEIG,
NEGLIGENCE WrHoUT FAULT (1951); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 74, at 508-10 (3d ed. 1964); Flem-
ing, The Role of Negligence in Modem Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REv. 815 (1967).
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insurer would be greatly inconvenienced by a New York trial. In the
absence of compulsory process, 8 insurers will certainly have difficulty
persuading witnesses to travel great distances to testify in foreign
litigation.
The legislature could adopt a plan reflecting the interests of both
resident plaintiffs and foreign insurers. Insurance companies might be
required to consent to direct actions by resident plaintiffs as a condition
to doing business in New York.59 The Superintendent of Insurance
could act as their agent for receipt of process in any action by a resident
plaintiff against one of their insureds. The appearance and cooperation
of insureds can be secured by granting immunity from the imposition
of personal jurisdiction.00 Of course, when insureds refuse to appear
and cooperate, the statutory, procedure should be inoperable. As a fur-
ther guarantee of fairness for insurers, the legislature should adopt a
forum non conveniens provision charging the judiciary with the duty
of weighing the interests of each party.61 If the insurer can show that
New York litigation would be inconvenient and prejudicial, the courts
should be required to dismiss the suit. An example of such prejudice is
the refusal of an important witness to testify in New York.
The insurance industry is likely to oppose such legislation on the
ground that it will result in higher verdicts. Their fear of jury reaction
to insurer defendants is somewhat naive, however, since New York
58 The absence of compulsory process has been cited by the Supreme Court as one
consideration in deciding whether forum non conveniens is applicable. In Gulf Oil Corp.
v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947), the court listed the following important considerations:
[R]elative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process
for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing,
witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the
action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious
and inexpensive.
Id. at 508.
59 This statute would be different from the Louisiana direct action statute which
allows direct actions only where the cause of action arises in the state. LA. Rav. STAT.
ANN. § 22:655 (Supp. 1967). In sustaining the predecessor of the Louisiana statute, the
Supreme Court pointed to the state's interests when the cause of action arose in the
state. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assur. Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72 (1954); see discussion in
note 6 supra. But that statute is not premised on the consent of the insurer to service,
and there seems little doubt that a party can be required to consent to service without
offending the constitution. Cf. Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Constr.
Co., 257 U.S. 213, 216 (1921).
60 The New York common law provides immunity from personal service for a wit-
ness who enters the state for the sole purpose of testifying. But this immunity lies
within the court's discretion, and a legislative provision would guarantee freedom from
personal service without any fear of judicial abuse of discretion. See J. WaNSTEm, H.
KoRu, & A. MIrER, Naw YorK Civu. PRAcTicE, 308.05-.07 (1967).
61 This would change the New York presumption against dismissing any suit involv-
ing resident plaintiffs. See 26 FoRDHAM L. Rav. 534, 535 & n.6 (1957).
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jurors assume that a defendant is insured.62 An additional objection
might be that the proposed legislation will deprive the industry of a
possible bargaining point in effecting settlements, since New York
plaintiffs, with their home forum available, will no longer accept a
smaller sum to avoid litigating elsewhere. Although this argument has
some merit, the insurer's ability to effectively defend in any forum and
the plaintiff's convenience are overriding considerations. Regardless of
the eventual judicial disposition of Seider, the proper alignment of the
rights and duties involved can be accomplished only through informed
legislative channels.
Stanley Schwartz
62 Motor vehicle insurance is compulsory in New York. N.Y. Vr_. & TRAF. LAW
§§ 330-68 (McKinney 1960). See Lassiter, Direct Actions Against the Insurer, 1949 INs. L.J.
411, 416, where the author argues that concealment of insurance is more prejudicial to
the carriers than disclosure of its existence, since most juries merely assume that the de-
fendant is insured. Disclosure would permit insurers to plead for a fair verdict from the
jury and perhaps this would result in lower verdicts.
